, and three anonymous reviewers.
. 1 For a brief discussion of Pulse Polio, see Jeffery & Jeffery (2010b) . Table 1 ). There is now a substantial body of scientific but critical work that focuses on the technical limitations of the PPI. Our critique of the PPI, by contrast, approaches the topic from an ethnographic angle and is primarily concerned with the grassroots-level sociopolitical implications of the intensified Pulse Polio rounds and the Underserved Strategy in the polio hot spots.
< Textbox 1: Research Context and Methods about here>
We draw on our long-term research in rural Bijnor district, western UP, particularly in two adjacent villages, Jhakri and Dharmnagri (see Textbox 1). Whilst polio cases continue to be reported from the district, it is not a polio hot spot, but it abuts the districts that are. Bijnor was one of nine districts covered by the Underserved Strategy and it has experienced much the same degree of surveillance and number of immunisation rounds as its neighbours (Chaturvedi 2008: 153) . The PPI was not central to our work-but it was in full swing during our 2002-5 fieldwork. Staff at the government Additional Primary Health Centre (PHC) on the periphery of Dharmnagri, along with the trained dāī (traditional birth attendant) from Jhakri and the anganwadī (crèche) worker from Dharmnagri, were making regular rounds in both villages administering polio drops-and Pulse Polio often became a talking point when we updated the maternity histories for all the married women in the two villages, which included detailing children's immunisations.
Our discussion of the PPI and the Underserved Strategy raises several issues.
Coercion by the polio teams (highlighted in the quotes that began this paper) indicates that immunisation programmes supposedly intended to enhance collective wellbeing may be confronted by civilian resistance. Muslim parents have often been reported to be more likely than others to refuse permission for their children to be given the polio drops. A widespread public perception reflected in the media is that Muslim recalcitrance is responsible for the continuing polio clusters that endanger everyone.
Even though resistance had been overwhelmed by 2005, such a perception continues to echo hoary stereotypes of Muslims as anti-national intransigents who refuse to adopt behaviour beneficial to their own as well as to the national good. As a marginalised religious minority, however, Muslims in western UP have good reason to be suspicious of the PPI.
Moreover, the PPI arguably reflects the agendas of global funders, not the priorities of local communities. Indeed, over the years, Hindu and Muslim villagers alike have repeatedly criticised government health services for failing to deal with the health issues that worry them most. Their concerns echo other critiques of the PPI, particularly the diversion of resources from other health-related activities that could address the social determinants of health and health inequalities.
Pulse Polio Initiative and the Underserved Strategy
Before elaborating on these points, however, we outline the background to the PPI and the Underserved Strategy and the technical criticisms levelled at it (see Textbox 2). In 1978, India's Expanded Programme on Immunisation was established with the aim of providing universal immunisation coverage to tackle several infectious diseases, including polio. The EPI was upgraded in 1985 to the Universal Immunisation Programme, partly because of the impetus provided by Rajiv Gandhi's Immunisation Mission. The programme used trivalent oral polio vaccine (tOPV, to combat P1, P2 and P3). Until the late 1980s, it was largely based on surveillance and the containment of polio outbreaks by immunising those who had been in contact with reported cases.
In 1988, the World Health Assembly proposed a targeted programme whose aim was WHO commented on 'poor participation' and 'inadequate engagement' especially among 'high-risk minority groups', who needed to understand the importance of 'continued, repeated campaigns' (WHO 2002 (WHO : 323, 2003 (WHO : 70, 2006b . The Underserved Strategy was now tasked with actively persuading parents to agree to their children receiving the drops (Chaturvedi 2008: 139) . Local Muslim leaders were asked to publicise Pulse Polio during Friday sermons and in madrasas (Islamic schools). Madrasas were also encouraged to host Pulse Polio teams. Prominent educational institutions were asked to provide access to their alumni, including Jamia Millia University and Jamia Hamdard in Delhi, Aligarh Muslim University, and Daruʼl ʻUlūm at Deoband and Mazāhir-i ʻUlūm in Saharanpur (important theological seminaries in western UP whose graduates account for most imams and madrasa teachers in the area). Celebrities appeared in public service advertisements and sometimes in person-particularly Amitabh Bachchan, but also Muslim film stars such as Aamir Khan and Shahrukh Khan and the Indian and Pakistani cricket teams.
Publicity materials more user-friendly for Muslims began to appear in Urdu, in addition to those in Hindi, and more women were recruited as local coordinators since they could access people's homes better (Chaturvedi 2008) . VAPP and 21 were due to cVDPV. Thus, the reported declines in polio may appear more striking than they are (and the figures in Table 1 need to be read with some caution).
Satyamala et al. consider that the failure to eradicate polio is not due to 'lack of proper implementation but to a basic flaw in the strategy itself' and the 'single technological solution was unsound, epidemiologically speaking' because the programme was introduced without any sanitary reforms. Thus, they conclude, 'the wild virus continues to lurk in the underground, biding its time, waiting to strike later' (Sathyamala et al. 2005a: 381) . Others argue that aiming to control polio-rather than eradicate it-may be a more realistic goal and that inactivated polio vaccine (IPV) needs to be part of that effort (Arita et al. 2006; Paul 2006 ).
Nevertheless, proponents consider that the interruption of wild poliovirus transmission in India is technically feasible and imminent. Failures of coverage and the 'suboptimal efficacy of OPV' in parts of north India are blamed for polio cases.
The way forward is a sustained and robust final push in the hot spots, with 
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sanitation were regarded as a threat not so much to their own bodies but to the body politic-whilst poverty, the OPV and deficiencies in the public health system in general were not implicated (Continho & Banerjea 2000: 665, 713; Das et al. 2000: 630) . Similarly, the Underserved Strategy is a tacit acknowledgement that some 2010.537744. linking them to other studies, we now turn to popular rumours about polio vaccine, responses to pockets of resistance, then take a longer-term view of other health-related campaigns, and finally question the prioritisation of the polio programme within health care provision more generally.
The not-so-silent circulation of rumours
The propensity of Muslims to refuse to permit their children to take the polio drops has been widely noted and during our own fieldwork, the lengthiest and most critical (or at least questioning) commentaries came from people in Jhakri, a Muslim village.
Some women had heard of children succumbing to what they termed 'polio' after having the drops or some injections (as indicated above, this 'rumour' is not implausible). Women's main fear, however, was that polio drops would stop their nasl 
18
programme-would frighten children (Chaturvedi et al. 2009; Dasgupta et al. 2008 ).
Rumours about the effects of polio vaccine and why it was being administered free of charge, and suspicions about the frequency of immunisation rounds and the motivations of government staff, were also reported from a study in Moradabad and In Jhakri, too, some people accepted the drops. One busy mother told us, laughing as she did so, how her 3-year old daughter would listen for the whistle announcing the start of the day's work and promptly commandeer a neighbour's older child to carry her baby sister to obtain polio drops for them. Along with one of the most educated 
Coercion, deception and surveillance
Like other targeted programmes, the PPI has been associated with military metaphors such as 'campaigns', 'weapons', 'enemy' and a premium on meeting 'targets'-which puts pressure on teams at the local level (see, for instance, Hardon & Blume 2005: 347). Chaturvedi's description of the Social Mobilisation Network in UP is a case in point: 'an army faced with a critical war situation where troops are deployed, mobilised and constantly trained to face any eventuality' (Chaturvedi 2008: 139) .
Staff may receive incentives for meeting 'targets'-and punishments if they fail.
When fears about the effects of the polio drops translate into resistance, the task More recently, the smallpox eradication campaign in the mid-1970s included instructing staff to use force if necessary to counter any resistance (which, notably, was most prevalent in UP and Bihar), systems of active surveillance and aggressive searches for defaulters, deployment of police and paramilitary forces, inspection tours including foreign officials, and incentives to locals to report suspected smallpox cases (Bhattacharya 2006: 124, 201, 212-239) . Target populations responded in diverse ways: some seemingly willingly accepted what was being pressed upon them but others offered resistance (Bhattacharya 2006: 230ff.) . Greenough underlines the compulsions faced by smallpox campaign workers and their tendency to underplay the coercion they themselves then exercised: coercion was normalised and could feed seamlessly into other campaigns (Greenough 1995b) . Immunisation programmes, he comments, are never just about immunisation: a 'logic of resistance' reflects wider issues, including the fears of minorities about the agendas of the majority, and a 'residue of resentment' feeds into people's responses to other government health campaigns (Greenough 1995b: 633 & 643; see also Nichter 1995: 618 ). The political Emergency (1975 Emergency ( -1977 is particularly salient: the government's family planning programme was pursued with particular single-mindedness, with stringent sterilisation targets for family planning and other government staff (including schoolteachers) that resulted in coercive practices, particularly against the poor and religious minorities in northern India (e.g. Connelly 2006; Gwatkin 1979; Vicziany 1983 ). During our research in Bijnor in 1982, health workers told us how they had persuaded unwilling 'cases' that laparoscopic sterilisation was merely an injection to prevent conception for 5 years. Villagers told us about men being rounded up to be sterilised, and of men hiding in the sugarcane fields to avoid being caught. These 
Diversion of resources
Clearly, polio has a major impact on the quality of life and prospects of children who suffer from chronic paralysis, whether due to wild poliovirus or oral vaccine. Yet, the PPI is not associated with programmes to rehabilitate children affected by polio, leave aside children paralysed by other causes. Without wanting to underplay this shortcoming, however, we want finally to raise some wider questions that featured in our conversations in rural Bijnor, as well as in the critical literature.
Opposition to Pulse Polio is 'highly complex and cannot be explained by religious affiliation alone' and it has been most conspicuous in areas that have not been well served by government development programmes (Bhattacharya & Dasgupta 2009 : 1182 . UP is notorious for its poor infrastructure, including health service provision.
Indeed, Hindus and Muslims alike have sometimes used their compliance with polio immunisation to bargain for development goods such as clean water provision, drainage and roads (Chaturvedi 2008: 49-53; Chaturvedi et al. 2009 refers to the breakdown of government health services in UP and people's lack of faith in them (e.g. because of the illegal sale of medicines and the high priority of family planning) and she admits that polio is often not a priority for poor people (Chaturvedi 2008: 96-98, 112, 174, 279 ). Yet she downplays these considerations. As Arora et al. comment, however, a 'reliable and responsive primary health care system will go a long way to dispel cynicism and facilitate effective community dialogue' (Arora et al. 2007: 501 which to make such a judgement.
Data from north India from the first and second rounds of the National Family Health Survey (NHFS-1 1992-3 and NFHS-2 1998-9), however, provided 'little evidence to support synergy between polio campaign and non-polio EPI vaccinations (measles, DPT)' (Bonu et al. 2003 (Bonu et al. : 1807 . Another study, using 1997-1998 data, argued that no negative effects of Pulse Polio could be identified, but that the possible positive annually in UP, around 360,000 infants each year die before their first birthdays (and many more suffer ailments that compromise healthy growth). But polio and AFP in general make relatively small contributions to UP's profile of child mortality and morbidity.
In sum, the Pulse Polio Initiative has been a coercive programme. Rather than reexamining its widely-criticised systemic limitations, the official response has been to redouble efforts to persuade doubting and resisting civilians (especially Muslims) to comply during the ever more frequent and intensively-monitored immunisation Bijnor district and on our research methods, see our publications listed in the bibliography.
